RECENT CASES.
ALIEN -CITIZENSnIP-AEI:BRSIIIP

IN THE 1.

V. W.

AS A BAR To NAT-

U ALIZATION.--In the examination of an alien who was seeking citizenship by
naturalization, the petitioner testified that he was a member of, and believed
in the doctrines and practices of, the Industrial Workers of the World. When

asked-if he would support the Constitution of the United States if it should
be found to be in conflict with such organization, he answered that he believed in the Constitution of the United States and likewise in the order, that
he was not aware of any conflict as he understood it, but he refused to say
that he would, under any and all circumstances, support the laws and Constitution of the United States. Held: Petition denied. In the Matler of the
Petition of Gust Olsen, U. S. D. C., W. Dist. Wash., March -7;, 1925.

In the Naturalization Act (34 ST&AT. AT L. kg6), it is provided that the
petitioner shall declare on oath in open court that he will support and defend
the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign
and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same (sec. 4, subsec.
3). Sec. 7 provides further that no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed
to organized government or who is a member of, or affiliated with, any organization entertaining and teaching such belief in, or. opposition to, organized
government, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of the United States.
In the present case the Court, if it had so chosen could have rested its decision
on the narrow ground that the petitioner refused to declare his true faith and
allegiance to the Constitution oi the United States. The decision is, however,
based on the reason that the I. W. W. is an order opposed to organized government and that a 'firm believer in its doctrines and practices could not
conscientiously support the Constitution of the United States. It has been
held that failure to disclose membership in the I. W. V. at the time of application for citizenship was sufficient fraud to warrant the annulment of the
certificate of naturalization. "U. S. v. Suelgin, 254 Fed. 884 (D. C., xi8).
It is unquestionably true that the organization is opposed to capital and to
the wage system. The preamble of its official membership book recites that
between the working class and the employing class a struggle must go on
until the workers of the world unite as a class, take possession of the earth
and the machinery of production, and abolish the wage system. It does not
confine itself to legitimate methods of obtaining those results, but "as a revolutionary organization, the Industrial Workers of the World aims to use any
and all tactics that will get the results sought with the least expenditure of
time and-energy." VIcEN ST. JOHN, THE I. W. W., ITS HISTORy, STRuCTURE AND METHOD. Its teachings and practices are not such as tend to the
domestic peace and tranquillity for which the Constitution of the United
States. stands.
Aliens are not granted citizenship as a privilege which they may demand,
but as an act of grace by the government, which may fix such conditions as
it sees fit. In re Sigehnan, -_68 Fed. 217 (D. C., 192o). The burden is on the
petitioner to prove that he has complied with all the requirements of the Naturalization Act: In re Vasicek, 271 Fed. 326 (D. C.; 1gz1). In the- present
case the petitioner having failed to convince the Court that he does not belong
to any organization opposed to organized government must fail in his petition.
(434)
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B1ILLS AND NOTES-CoXsDERnTIO,-I ofoAL OBLIGATION;-RNEWAL OF Noru
VOID FOR ALTERATION.-The defendant purchased an automobile from the plain-

tiff and agreed to give a note at four months with six per cent. interest from
date. The note he executed was on a printed form which provided for eight
per cent. interest from maturity. The plaintiff without the knowledge or
consent of the defendant, altered it to conform to the original contract. The
defendant did not see the altered note until he had signed the renewal note,
when it was returned to and kept by him until the suit on the renewal note
was brought. Held (two dissenting) : Plaintiff could recover, since there was
sufficient evidence of legal and moral consideration to support the finding of
the trial court that the note was a binding instrument.' Born v. Lafayette Auto
Co., 145 N. E. 833 (Ind., 1924), superseding 139 N. E. 364, which. gave juagment for the defendant.
A note which has been materially altered without the assent of all parties
is void as to the non-assenting parties. An alteration which changes the sum
payable as to either principal or interest is material. N. I. L., secs. x24, i25.
The original note was therefore void. An agreement to renew a void note is
void. Campbell v. Sloan, 62 Pa. 481 (1869); Wheelock v. Berkeley, 138 ilL
153, 27 N. E. 942 (i 9i). But where a note taken in lieu of another is
founded on-a valuable consideration independent of that on which the original was founded, a failure of the original consideration is no defense in an
action on the latter note. MuirhJead v. Kirkpatrick, 21 Pa. 237 (1853). Mbreover, although a note is void because of a material alteration, in the absence
of fraud the original debt is not destroyed. Keene v. Wecks, 19 R. I. 309, 33
-Atl. 446 (I895); Edington v. McLeod, 87 Kans. 426, i24 Pac. 163 (i92).
If, in the instant case, it had been possible to say that the note was
given, not as a renewal of the prior note, but in consideration of the former
debt, plaintiff should recover. N. I. L., sec. 25. If he had sued on the original
debt he should also be allowed to recover. Zdington v. McLeod, ssrpra. As
neither party raised these points the note must be treated as being given
solely in renewal of the vbid note.
I.
The court cites several cases in support of the proposition that a note
given in consideration of a moral obligation is a good note. Certain types of
moral obligation are sufficient consideration for a common law contract.
Carey v. Hess, 112 Ind. 398, 14 N. -E. 235 (i887) ; Heady v. Boden, 4 Ind. App.
475, 30 N. E. 1119 (1892). Notes founded on such a consideration should
be upheld. N. I. L., sec. 25; Eastwood v. Kenyon, Ii Ad. & E. 438 (i84o);
Gidding v. Giddings, Si Vt. 227 (1878). If the note sued on in the present
case had been given after the running of the statute of limitations in consideration of the original debt, it would come under this rule. But it was given
about nine months after the creation of the debt by the purchase of the
automobile and suit was begun in the space of a few months thereafter.
It is impossible to ascertain from the facts of the case or from the previous
reports whether or not the statute had run while the appeal was pending but
the defendant's strenuous prosecution of the appeal hardly lends color to the
inference that he renewed his promise after the running of the statute. The
note was given for what plaintiff and defendant both supposed was a binding
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legal obligation, and not for an obligation which would not otherwise be
legally enforceable.
The court seems to have felt that the plaintiff ought to recover, and so
found consideration for the note. The view of the dissenting justices, however, is preferable both from the point of view of logic and of stability in the
law of negotiable instruments.
.
CAuuIEs-FREaGHT CHARGES--.ABILITY OF CosiGNEE.-The defendant
bought specific steel beams, but others were sent in their stead under a uniform bill of lading which stipulated that "the owner or consignee shall pay
the freight and all other lawful charges accruing on said property and if
required shall pay the same before delivery." The defendant refused to accept
the beams because they were not the goods he ordered. The plaintiff, a common carrier, sold them for freight and demurrage charges and sued the defendant for the deficit. Held: The plaintiff cannot recover. Phila. and Reading Ry. Co. v. International Motor Co., Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Feb.
27, 1925.
Such a stipulation in the bill of lading does not relieve the consignor of
his obligation to pay the freight, when the carrier delivers to the consignee
without collecting the charges. It is considered to be provided entirely for
the carrier's benefit, as a recognition of his right to payment before delivery.
But when the consignee accepts deiivery under such a bill of lading, he also
becomes liable for the freight charges. A contract to pay is implied from the
fact that he accepted under a bill of lading -containing this stipulation, when
he knew that the carrier waived his lien on the expectation that the consignee
would pay the freight charges. N. Y. Central R. R. Co. v. Warren Ross Co4
234 N. Y. 261, 137 N. E. 324 (1922); Pa. R. R. Co. v. Whitney, 73 Pa. Super.
588 (1920) ; Pa. R. R. Co. v. Townsend, go N. J. L 75, 1oo At. 855 (97);
Union Pac. R. Co. v. American S. &- R. Co., 2o2 Fed. 720 (C. C. A., 1912).
Clearly, under these principles the instant case is correctly decided, since
the defendant refused to accept the goods. But it would seem to conflict with
the doctrine of Pa. R. R. Co. v. Descalzi, 59 Pa. Super. 614 (19z5), in which.
it was held that a consignee who refused to receive a sfiipment, on the ground
that the goods were not of the kind or grade ordered, would nevertheless be
liable to the carrier for the freight. In that case melons of lower grade were
sent, but the court leld that this was no defense; that melons were orderea
and melons were sent, and that such a defense would be available only if the
article sent were entirely different from that ordered. This rule, also recognized in P. & R. Ry. Co. v. Parry, 66 Pa. Super. 49 (1917), seems entirely
anomalous. It is tantamount to holding that the consignee must take the
goods, although it cannot even be said that title ever passed to him, and then
adjust his differences with his vendor. There is no practical advantage in such
a proceeding and it clearly is in .conflict with legal reasoning. This curioun
doctrine could have been applied to the facts of the instant case, for steel
beams were bought and steel beams were sent. The court, however, distinguished the Dcscalzi Case, sutpra, on facts on which the court in that case did
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not rely at all. It would seem, therefore, that the Superior Court has recognized the rule of the Descalzi Case, supra, to be unsound, but is not prepared
expressly to overrule it.
CHATTEL MORTGAGF.-COSTRUCTIV' XOTICE-U.PLANTED Cors.--One Keller, being indebted to the plaintiff, executed a chattel mortgage on certain
horses and mules, the instrument containing an agreement by Keller to give
the plaintiff a mortgage on crops to be planted during that season. This
chattel mortgage was duly recorded. Keller then executed a mortgage on
the crops to the defendant. The crops were sold and by consent of the parties
the proceeds paid into court. The defendant had no actual notice of the
recorded agreement by Keller. Held: The defendant did not take with notice
either constructive or actual of the first agreement to mortgage. American
State Bank of Scottsbluff v. Keller, ct al., 2oo N. W. 999 (Neb., 1924).
There seems to be little doubt that in laying down the principle that a
mortgage on unplanted crops is void at law the court is in agreement with7
the weight of authority. Cusseta Bank v. Ellaville Guano Co., 143 Ga. 312,
85 S. E. xg (1915) ; Cheatham v. Kelley, i7o Ky. 429, 186 S. NV. 128; Kelley
'v. Goodwin, 95 Me. 538, 5o AtI. 7II (igoi). Some states say that although
void at law, a mortgage on crops the seed of which has not yet been planted
will give the mortgagee a lien on the crop upon its coming into existence,
which a court of equity will enforce as against persons! other than bona fide
purchasers for value without notice. Hurst v. Bell, 72 Ala. 336 (i882).;
Apperson v. Moore, 30 Ark. 56 (iS75) ; Richardson v. Washington, 88 Tex.
In some states, however, a mortgage on un339, 31 S. W. 614 (i893).
planted crop is upheld either by statute; Grand Forks National Bank v. Minnesota Electric Co., 6 N. D. 357, 43 N. W. 8o6 (i889) ; Senter v. Mitchell, 16
Fed. 2o6 (C. C., 1883) ; or on the ground that the crop has a potential existence which gives validity to the mortgage. Briggs v. United States, 143 U. S.
346 (189i); iWilkerson v. Thorp, i28 Cal. 221, 6o Pac. 679 (igoo); Dickey v.
J
Waldo, 97 Mich. 255, 56 N. NV. 6o8 (i893).
The court in the instant case ignores the distinction sometimes made
between goods not in existence and goods having a potential existence. In the
former case, a mortgage is undoubtedly void. Deeley v. Dwight, 132 N. Y.
59, 30 N. E. 258 (1892) ; Grifith v. Douglass, 73 Me. 532 (1882) ; France v.
Thomas, 86 Mo. So (1885). The decision in the principal case, however, may
be justified on two grounds: first, that it is in accord with the law of Nebraska as laid down in Cole v. Kerr, 19 Neb. 553, 26 N. NV. 598 (1886), but
see Sporer v. McDermott, 69 Neb. 533, 96 N. W. 232 (1903), an action in
equity; secondly, which is the stronger argument, that the agreement to give
the mortgage on the unplanted crops was part of a mortgage of other unrelated chattels and would therefore not be constructive notice on the principle
that even when an instrument is properly recorded it gives notice of its general character and main purpose, and also of all facts properly connected with
the transaction recorded; 23 R. C. L 216, sec. 79; but not of facts recited
therein which are not connected with the transaction from which the authority
to record is derived. Mucllcr v. Engeln, 75 Ky. 441 (1876).
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COSTI-UTJONAL LAw-FouRTEETnT

AMENDMF.NT-UNRASONABLE

CLASSI-

FJCATION.-By the Act of June 14, 1923, P. L 802, the Legislature of Penn-

sylvania prohibited the use of "shoddy" in the making or renovating of
mattresses, pillows, bolsters, feather beds, comfortables, cushions, or articles
of upholstered furniture; but allowed second-hand materials to be used, if
properly sterilized. Plaintiff, a manufacturer of comfortables, sought to enjoin the enforcement of the act, alleging that it was a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. It was
agreed that shoddy can be rendered harmless by sterilization. Held: This
prohibition of. the use of shoddy was unconstitutional. Palmer Bros. Co. v.
Weaver, Chief of Bureau of Inspection, etc., of Corn. of Pa., U. S. District
Court of Pa., Western District, March 9, 925_.
The decision was placed squareli on the ground that the regulation was
unreasonable, since it was admitted that shoddy could be rendered harmless
by sterilization. The court also found that the classification was improper,
as discriminating against manufacturers of stuffed articles and in favor of
manufacturers of woven materials' such as blankets and clothing materials.
It is not a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws to make classifications in the effort to regulate under the police power, but such classification
must have a real and not an arbitrary basis, and the regulation must be
reasonable. Had there been any doubt that shoddy could be made harmless,
the judgment of the legislature would have prevailed. WI LOUGHBY, CoNSTITUTIO AL LAW, sec. 48o, ct seq. See also Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27
(1885); Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446 (ix5). Twenty-seven states have
legislated on the subject of bedding, and some of them have prohibited entirely
the use of shoddy, but the constitutionality of this absolute prohibition has
not come up before, so that very probably this case will go to the Supreme
Court for final determination. On principle, the decision seems sound. The
prohibition of the use of shoddy seems to be based not on any valid reason but
on a prevailing hostility to shoddy as such. Any valid objection to shoddy
applies equally well to second-hand material; but as both can be rendered
harmless, and as in fact shoddy is merely a prepared form of second-hand
material, any prohibition or regulation of one without the other is clearly
discriminatory.
CO.NTRACTs-REsTRICTIVE COVENANTS-ENFORCEABILITY

BY AsSIGNM.-The

A Co. granted radio patent rights to the B Co., reserving certain rights of
manufacture and sale for amateur use. These rights were restricted by a
covenant that the A Co. would sell no apparatus except upon written agreement of the purchaser not to.use the apparatus in commercial radio, and not
to transfer the apparatus to another. This was intended to protect the B Co.
in the commercial field. The rights passed from the B Co. through the C
Co. and D Co. to the E. Co., operating in the amateur field. The E Co. seeks
specific performance of the covenant against the A Co. From a decree
granting an injunction the defendant appeals. Held: Injunction refused. The
Radio Corporation of America v. De Forest Radio Telephone and Telegraph
Co., 127 AtI. 678 (N. J. Ch., 1925).
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Putting aside the question of restraint of trade, it would be interesting
to learn whether the benefit of such a restrictive covenant runs, in equity,
with such a license. It has been held that the burden of a restrictive agreement will run with a chattel. Murphy v. Christian Press Asso. Pub. Co.,
38 App. Div. 426, 56 N. Y. Supp. 597 (1899); N.'Y. Bank-Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank-Note Engraving & Printing Co., 83 Hum 593, 31 N. Y. Supp.
io6o (1895) ; see i7 H~av. L. REV. 415. But the weight of authority seems
opposed. Toddy v. Sterious, [i9o4] i Ch. Div. 354; McGruther v. Pitcher,
[i9o4] 2 Ch. Div. 3o6; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U. S. 373 (1911) ; Boston Store v. American Gramophone Co., 246 U. S.
8 (1918) ; see 25 HiAv. L. REv. 63. In most of the chattel cases there was
no definite property for the benefit of which the restriction was imposed.
Here, however, we have the restriction of one portion of the patent right
for the benefit of another, so that the analogy to dependent parcels of real
estate seems very close.
However, the court assumed the plaintiff's right to sue, and found no
violation of the covenant which it would enjoin. The restriction was intended to protect the obligee's rights in the commercial field; enforcement
is now sought to protect these rights in the amateur field. This situation
also finds a close analogy in the law of covenants restrictive upon land, socalled equitable servitudes. Just as the enforcenient of the servitude depends
on the possibility of carrying out the original purpose; Trustees of Columbia
College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311 (x88z) ; 3z H.Av. L REv., 876, 879; so here
the enforcement of the restrictive covenant fails, on the failure of the original
purpose.
INHERITANCE TAX-EQUITABLE CONVERSiON oF LAND OursIE THE STAT,--

The executors of the deceased who was domiciled in South Carolina appealed
from the assessment of an inheritance tax in South Carolina upon real estate
in Pennsylvania devised. to the executors in trust to sell and distribute part
of the proceeds to a charitable corporation in Pennsylvania; the appeal was
from the assessment on the share going to the Pennsylvania corporation.
Held: An equitable conversion being worked by the direction in he will.to
sell, by the law of -Pennsylvania the realty became personalty and taxable by
South Carolina under the principle of mobilia sequuntur personam. Land
Title & Trust Co. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 26 S. E. 189 (S. C.,
1925).
The authorities all state that land situated in another state is not subject
to an inheritance tax; Mar's Estate, 240 Pa. 38, 87 At]. 291 (1913) ; People v.
Kellogg, 268 Ill. 489 (i915); GLEASON*AND OTIS, INHERITANCE TAXATION, (3d
ed.) 3o; although the cases on which these statements are based are not
strongly in- point. See Connell v. Crosby, 210 Ill. 380, 71 N. E. 35 (i9o4);.
Attorney Generalv. Barney, 21! Mass. I34, 97 N. E. 750 (1912); In Re Estate
of Suift, 137 N. Y. 77, 32 N. E. io96 (I893); Gallup's Appeal, 76 Conn. 6x7,
57 Atl. 699 (i9o4). In these cases either the taxing statute does not include
such land or the decision is not well considered. Yet the rule is considered
to be well settled.
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As in the principal case, the value of such land has been included in assessing the tax when the doctrine of equitable conversion could be applied,
in the courts of Pennsylvania and Iowa. Miller v. Commonwealth, izz Pa.
.az, z Atl. 492 (1885); Williamron's Estate, 153 Pa. 508, 26 AtI. 246 (1893);
In Re Sanford's Estate, x88 Iowa 833, 175 N. AV. 5o6 (192o). The application of the doctrine for purposes of taxing land outside the state is limited
to cases where the will directs that the proceeds of the sale be used for general purposes of administration or of the residuary estate, a so-called "out
and out" conversion, and not where they are to go as specific legacies. See
Mart"s Estate, supra, following the analysis in a note by Howard W. Page,
in 32 Am. L REG. 474. Also the direction must be positive, or it must be
absolutely necessary to sell immediately, and not left to the discretion ot
trustees; Re Chamberlain, 257 Pa. 1i3, ,oi At. 314 (1917); nor to be sold in
the future at the end of a period of time or after an intervening estate.
Marr's Estate supra, Ann. Cas. xgiA 167 with note; Handley's Estate, i8i
Pa. 339, 37 Atl. 587 (z897).
English cases cited to uphold the view adopted in. the principal case are
not in point. It was held that a conversion would not operate to subject land
to a legacy tax; Cunstance v. Bradshaw, 4 Hare 315, 67 E. L 669 (i845);
and though later cases, distinguishing that case, permitted it so to operate,
the land was converted because it was part of partnership assets before death
and not by direction to sell after death. Forbes v. Stevens, L. X, io Eq.
178 (i870); Stokes v. Ducroz, 62 L. T. R. (N. S.) 176 (i89o). It was said,
however, that a legatee cannot "with the same breath say, effectually-'Give
me the money because it is residuary personal estate,' and declare that it is
not taxable because it is not residuary personal estate." The same reason
underlies the Pennsylvania view; if for purposes of administration the land
has become personalty, no matter by what doctrine, it will be taxed as such
by the State.
All other states where the -question has arisen, refuse to apply the doctrine.
In Re Estate of Swift, supra; Connell v. Crosby, supra; McCurdy v. McCurdy, 197 Mass. 248, 82 N. E. 881 (xgo7). It is said, that an equitable fiction should not be used to obtain over land in another state a taxing jurisdiction not otherwise had.
Since the law of the actual situs governs the status and transfer of land,
the equitable conversion must operate by the law of the situs in order that the
state of deceased's domicile may tax as personalty. Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.
S. 186 (1899).
"The doctrine of equitable conversion . . . has been adopted solely for
the purpose of executing trusts." Condit v. Bigalow, 64 N. J. Eq. 5o4, 54 AtL
i6o (i9o3). It is based on the rule that equity regards as done those things
which ought to be done, but they will be so regarded "only in favor of those who
have a right to pray that they might be done." S-roRt, EQuiTy JurIspRuDENCZ,.
'(4th ed.) sec. 792. A legatee, but, not the state, is such a one, and the state
should not strictly, use the doctrine for taxing purposes. It is a matter of
opinion, whether today the rule should be stretched to permit it to do so.
The reason for the Pennsylvania view seems to warrant it, if no regard be
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had to other factors. But it is submitted that it is not warranted, because
it permits taxation by the state of domicile, by use of a fiction, of property
taxable in the state of its actual situs by better established principles; the rule,
mobilia scquuntur pcrsonan, whereby as personalty it is taxable in the state
of domicile, though too well established to be upset, is frowned upon when
it leads to taxation of the same property in two states. Blackstone v. Miller,
188 U. S. 189 (i9o3). The tendency today is to avoid that result, if possible,
rather than to find new means of attaining it, as was done in the principal case.
INTERSTATE CoMmF.cE-BRIDGES-POWERS OF STATE TO REGULATE.--The
Burkburnett Bridge Co. owned and operated a bridge across the Red River
and across the state line, between Oklahoma and Texas, all the traffic over
which was interstate. A complaint was filed with tht Corporation Commission of the State of Oklahoma setting forth that the rates charged by the
Bridge Cbmpany were excessive, and praying that the Commission fix a scale
of rates. The plaintiff filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the Commission. The
Commission overruled the plea and plaintiff appeals. Held: The Commission
of the State of Oklahoma has no power to fix rates for the use of the bridge.
[The decision was based on Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204
(i894), which was quoted at length, including the sentence: "We do not wish
to be understood as saying that in the absence of congressional legislation
or mutual legislation of the two states, the company has the right to fix tolls
at its own discretion."] Burkburnett Bridge Co. v. Cobb, et al., 233 Pac. 963
(Okla., 1925).
A state has no power to regulate rates on interstate ferries connected
with railroads engaged in interstate commerce, because Congress has legislated on the subject; N. Y. C., etc., R. R. v. Freeholders, 227 U. S. 248
(913); but since Congress has not legislated on the subject, a state has
power to regulate rates on interstate ferries unconnected with railroads engaged in interstate commerce. Port Richmond Ferry v. Freeholders,234 U. S.
317 (1914). Bridges are classed with ferries. Coving4on Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, supra; Port Richmond Ferry v. Freeholders,supra.
Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky,- supra, denies only the power of a
state to regulate rates on interstate bridges on persons coming into the state;
cf. Port Richmond Ferry v. Freeholders,supra. Therefore, it is submitted, a
state has power to regulate tolls on an interstate bridge on persons leaving
the state, in the absence of legislation on the subject by Congress. The
report of the principal case does not state if the tolls sought to be regulated
were those on peisons coming from Texas into Oklahoma, as well as on persons going from" Oklahoma into Texas. If they were, the principal case is
correct. If the tolls sought to be regulated were only those on persons leaving
Oklahoma, it is submitted that the principal case does not come within the
authority of Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, supra, and is incorrect.
SALES-CoNDITIONAL SALES-PASSAGE OF TnxTL-RSK OF Loss.-A harvester was sold on a contract of conditional sale stipulating payment of $1OO
on execution of the contract, $oo on delivery of possession, and the residue
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in two deferred annual payments. Notes were to be executed for the deferred payments, secured by a first mortgage on the harvester, and the vendee
was to pay all taxes and to insure against loss, naming the vendor as beneficiary in the policy. The title, was expressly reserved in the vendor until
payment in full. The machine was delivered and used for two or three days
when it was totally destroyed by fire without fault. The vendor sued on
the contract for the deferred payments. Held (three dissenting): The consideration in the contract had failed and the vendor could not recover. Holt
Mfg. Co. v. Jaussaud,233 Pa 35 (Wash., xg92).
The majority view, contra to the instant decision, holds that any loss or
gain during the installment period is borne by, or accrues to, the purchaser.
The consideration for the buyer's promise to pay is his possession of the
goods and his right to acquire absolute title upon payment in full Upon
delivery of possession, the seller has completely performed his part of the
contract. The legal title is retained only as security for the purchase price
and the buyer is said to have a qualified property in the chattel, somewhat
analagous to that of a mortgagor of personalty. Burnley v. Tufts, 66 Miss.
48, 5 So. 627 (1888) ; American Soda Fountain Co. v. Vaughn, 69 N. J. 1h
582, 55 At. 54 (1904)

; WILLISTON, SALES, (2d ed.) 3o4.

This view is incor-

porated into the Uniform Sales Act, section 22 (a). O'Neil Adam: Co. v.
Ecklund, 89 Conn. 232, 93 AtL S24 (i9zS). The minority view, exemplified
in the instant case, refuses to recognize any division of the interest in the
chattel, as in the case of a mortgage, but considers the entire property in the
chattel to remain in the vendor. But since the seller's right in the chattel,
under the contract, is solely to secure the payment of the purchase price, the
logic of the question would seem to be with the majority.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-PART

PERFORMANCE BY LEssoR UNDR "OR.L CON-

T'RAcT.--The defendant entered into an oral contract with the plaintiff to take
a twenty-year lease of a flat, certain alterations to be made by the plaintiff.
During the progress of the alterations, the defendant frequently visited the
flat and made suggestions for further alterations, which were carried out by
the plaintiff at her request.. Defendant later repudiated the contract. In an
action for specific performance, the defendant relied on the Statute of Frauds.
Held: The extensive alterations made by the plaintiff at the request of the
defendant were sufficient part performance to take the contract out of the
Statute of Frauds, and plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of the
contract. Rawlinson v. Ames, [:925] 1 Ch. 9.
The principle, that part performance of an oral Contract pertaining to
land will, in equity, take the contract out of the Statute of Frauds, is accepted
law in England and in the vast majority of American jurisdictions. 4 PoXEROY EQurY JURISDICTION, sec. 14o9. Four American jurisdictions, Kentucky,
Mississippi, North Carolina, and Tennessee, reject the doctrine as a clear
violation of the express terms of the Statute of Frauds. 5 PoxMEoy EQUITY
JURISDICTIoN, sec. 2245, and cases cited. The majority, however, uphold the
principle on the ground that here there is at least equitable fraud and that
it is unjust that the Statute of Frauds should be used to protect fraud. In
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applying the principle, the courts insist on four prerequisites: (x) the acts
of part performance must be such as not only to be referable to a contract
such as alleged but to be referable to no other title; (2) they must be such
as to render it a fraud in the defendant to take advantage of the contract not
being in writing; (3) the contract to which they refer must be such as in
its own nature is enforceable by the court; and (4) there must be proper
parol evidence of the contract which is let in by the part performance. FRY,
SPEcIFIC PERORMANC; (6th ed.) 2-6.
The present case, unusual in that it is the lessor who has made the alterations and who is seeking specific performance, seems to meet these prerequisites. As to the third and fourth there can be no doubt. As to the
first, it appears that the alterations were unusual and were not such as the
plaintiff would have made except for the expected lease. Had they been such
as would have added value to the property, they could hardly be said to have
been referable to the contract alone, since the plaintiff would have actually
received a benefit, and it could be well argued that he might have made
them if there had been no expectancy of a lease. It is worthy of note that
most of the cases in which the lessee is suing require not only alterations by
the lessee but also an exchange of possession. Morrison v. Herrick, 130 IlL
631, 22 N. E. 537 (x8) ; Harrellv. Sonnabend, xg Mass. 310, 77 N. E. 764
(9o6); Pariy V. Miller, 247 Pa. 45, 93 Atl. 30 (1915). In the present case
change of possession would be unlikely to occur, because the alterations were
to be completed before the lease was to be made, and the lessee who contemplated repudiation of the oral contract would not go into possession. But.
possibly the strongest feature of this case is that it would be a fraud on
the plaintiff to allow the defendant to take advantage of the contract eing
oral. *Plaintiff had made extensive alterations; some of these affected the
marketability of the flat. There was no adequate measure of damages; the
defendant had acted in bad faith. There is, then, a very strong incentive
to apply the doctrine to- this case. The case is probably correctly decided on
its facts, although an extension of a doctrine in itself an anomaly.
WILLS AcT-Airmt-3oR CHILD-ILLEGiTimATE CHrLD.-The Pennsylvania
Wills Act of 1917, P. L. 403, sec. 21, provides: "When any person, male or
female, shall make a last will and testament, and afterward . . . shall have
a child or children not provided for in such will . . . although

.. ..

born

after the death of their father," every such person shall be deemed to die
intestate so far as regards such child or children. A single woman during
pregnancy made a will devising all her property to B, absolutely, by the
terms of the will, but in fact upon a secret parol trust. The terms of thet
trust made provision for the after-born child but were not communicated
to the trustee, B, until after the death of the testatrix. Held: The act includes an illegitimate child so far as regards its mother's will and there is
an intestacy as to such child unless expressly provided for in the wilL And
a secret parol trust, whether valid or invalid, is not such express provision.
Patterson'sEstate, 282 Pa. 396 (1925).
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By the common law, "children" means only legitimate children, but a
bastard may take under a will as one of the children if the intention of the
testator to include can fairly be gathered from the context and opleration of
the will. SCHOULER, WILLS, (6th ed.) 98!. Similarly, when used in legislation, the interpretation should be governed by the intention of the legislators,
as found in the context of the same statute or in related statutes. A Massachusetts statute merely granting the right of inheritance from the mother in
case of intestacy was held to make a bastard only an "heir" and not a "child"
of the mother withint the meaning of another statute. Kent v. Barker, 68
Mass. 55 (1854). But the Pennsylvania Legislature has granted not only
the right of inheritance; Intestate Act of x917, P. L. 429, sec. 15; but has
specifically repudiated the common law doctrine of filius nullius as regards
the mother and her illegitimate offspring, and has established the legal relation of parent and child; Act of xgor, P. L. 639, sec. I. It would seem
therefore that a bastard is fairly included in the above section and that the
court rightly-held the clause "although born after the death of their father"
to refer only to the particular case of. a legitimate posthumous child as regards
its father.
But in construing the clause "not provided for in the will" to refer only
to express provision in terms, in the will itself, the decision seems to e tinnecessarily narrow. A devise in a will upon a secret parol trust, the terms
of which are communicated to the trustee, by the weight of authority creates
a valid and'binding trust which may be enforced by the cestui que trust. See
37 HARV. L. REv. 655. While in the instant case the parol trust is unenforceable, yet under this decision a case could arise in which a child might take
its share under the Intestate Act and also, if not the sole heir, compel the
execution of a secret parol trust in its favor as to the residue.

